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Abstract 
The EU democratization policies have not achieved the expected results in Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) countries. On the contrary, they have led to the outbreak of the most important crisis in 
Europe after the end of the cold war. A new vision of cooperation in the field of democracy is 
necessary in the East, as long as even Georgia and Moldova, countries considered to be the most 
advanced among the EaP states, have not registered essential progress in the democratization of 
their societies. Assuming that democratization, as part of EU’s neighbourhood policies, can be 
considered a threat to Russia and hence a ‘destabilizing factor’ for the EU partners, this thesis 
tried to understand what changes can be made to EU policies and to what extent cooperation 
between EU and Russia is possible in the process developing democratization policies in Georgia 
and Moldova. While arguing for the revitalization of the instruments used for the implementation 
of the democratization policies, this thesis finds that cooperation between the EU and Russia in 
the field of democracy is excluded as long as the two geo-political actors have different values 
and different views on the notion of democracy. The most likely cooperation that might occur 
between EU and Russia is the establishment of a Common Economic Space ‘from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok’. Even though such a scenario would have the potential to reduce confrontation 
between the two actors in the common neighbourhood, this cooperation would, however, have a 
negative impact on the on-going democratic reforms in Georgia and Moldova.  
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Introduction 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and particularly one of its satellites, the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP), seem to have reached the stage where it is “no longer a relevant and viable 
policy framework in the beginning of 2015”.1 A new vision of cooperation in Eastern Europe is 
required in the field of democracy, as none of the six EaP participating countries2 have registered 
essential progress in this area. Although the internal factors of each state are playing a leading 
role in the failures of the EU democratization policies towards EaP countries, one should also 
consider the huge ‘Russian destabilizing factor’ that intervenes in this process. The author is 
talking here about Russian threats of gas supply disruptions, export bans, restrictive migration 
policies, activation of frozen conflicts and other threats, whose purpose is to thwart EaP 
countries moving closer to the European model of democracy. These Russian obstructionist 
policies seem to have intensified since 2013 when Moscow began to express openly its 
disagreement with EU democratization policies in Eastern Europe. The peak was reached when 
Russia halted the signature of the Association Agreements (AA) between the EU and two of the 
EaP countries, Armenia and Ukraine. The events that followed (the revolution of dignity in Maidan, 
the annexation of Crimea and then the civil war in Eastern Ukraine) astounded the European 
leaders as well as those of the EaP countries. The current crisis appears to be one of the most 
serious on the European continent after the end of the Cold War. Now, more than ever, many 
voices agree that identifying short and especially long-term solutions is imminent. But what 
should those solutions look like, and how could the EU change its democratization policies 
towards EaP countries so that they would ensure the prosperity and democratization of these ‘in-
between’ states and at the same time provide stability and security at the EU’s border? This is the 
central question of this paper:  
                                                          
1 G. Gromadzki, The Eastern Partnership after five years: time for deep rethinking, EP, Directorate-general for 
external policies of the Union, Policy department, 2015, p. 34. 
2 EaP includes: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 
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If democratization as part of the ENP and EaP can be considered a threat to Russia and hence a 
destabilizing factor for the EU partners, what changes can be made to these EU policies? 
(H1) The EU has applied in the EaP countries the same top-down approach of democratization, 
which worked very well in the Central Europe, but has not been very successful in Eastern Europe. 
The targeted countries were obliged to implement painful reforms without offering them the 
same incentive proposed to the Central European countries – accession to the EU. On top of that, 
the designers of the EU democratization policies in the Neighbourhood have not taken into 
account the role and influence that Russia has in these states through various levers, such as 
frozen conflicts.  
(H2) EU policies have to be shaped by including Russia in the political process of fashioning the 
democratization strategies towards EaP countries. But if cooperation is not possible in the field 
of democracy, there should be other opportunities for joint policymaking and a constructive 
interaction between Russia and the EU in EaP countries. 
 
Methodology and limitations  
 
Georgia and Moldova were chosen for this paper because both take part in the ENP and 
EaP and aspire to join the EU, and so far they have the most developed political relations with 
Brussels among the EaP states. The two countries also seem to be the Neighbourhood states 
that have achieved the best results in terms of democratization, a possible reason why they were 
systematically targeted by Russian economic and political pressure. The common history with 
the Soviet Union left them with similar problems and consequently facing similar pressuring 
instruments from Moscow: trade sanctions, energy shortages, restrictive migration policies, and 
activation of the frozen conflicts that they both have on their territories.  
For the purpose of this paper, the author will rely on relevant official documents, the 
academic existing literature, and information collected through eight semi-structured interviews 
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with officials and experts. As for the limitations of the paper, it is important to note that this 
paper does not aim to analyse the role of internal factors and dynamics in Georgia and Moldova, 
which drive the Europeanization process and represent the leading cause of the democratic 
failures in the two countries.3  
 
1. EU democratization policies in the Neighbourhood countries 
The EU began spreading democratic values around the world more consistently after the end of 
the Second World War. It established in 1993 the Copenhagen political conditions for accession 
to the European community, which contributed to “a more structured influence on the process of 
democratization.”4 These conditions were introduced then in the Accession agreements with 
Central European countries as well as with Balkan states. Since the late 1990s and the beginning 
of the 2000s, the EU has tried to apply the same scheme of democratization in EaP countries. In 
promoting democracy outside its borders, the EU’s interests represent “a matter of moral 
principle as well as enlightened self-interest”.5  
Experts closely studied the EU’s promotion of democracy. In this regard, Way & Levitsky 
defined two main ways of interaction between EU and targeted countries: Western leverage and 
linkage to the West. Through Western leverage, authors understand “governments’ vulnerability to 
external democratizing pressure”.6 It refers specifically to the countries’ bargaining power vis-à-
vis the West [EU], on the one hand, and the potential economic, political, security or other impact 
of EU action on the targeted states, on the other hand. At the same time, the term linkage to the 
                                                          
3 I. Solonenko & N. Shapovalova, Is the EU's Eastern Partnership promoting Europeanization?, FRIDE Policy 
Brief, No 97, Brussels, September 2011, p. 3. 
4 E. Baracani, ed., Democratization and Hybrid Regimes: International Anchoring and Domestic Dynamics in 
European Post-Soviet States, European Press Academic Publishing, Florence, 2010, p. 114. 
5 European Council, 2003 in A. A. Magen, & T. Risse & M. A. McFaul, eds., Promoting Democracy and the Rule 
of Law: American and European Strategies. Governance and Limited Statehood Series, Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009, p. 3. 
6 L. A. Way & S. Levitsky, “Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide”, East European Politics & 
Societies 21, No. 1, February 2007, p. 50. 
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West designates “the density of a country’s economic, political, organizational, social, and 
communication ties to the West”.7  
Emerson et al. distinguish two mechanisms for setting into motion the EU democratization 
policies: conditionality and socialization. “Under the conditionality model, the EU offers advantages 
to the neighbour […] on the condition that economic and/or political conditions are met”.8 In the 
second model of interaction, socialization, the focus is put on the attractiveness of the EU as a 
system of society based on democracy and rule of law. Through socialization, people from partner 
countries are changing their behaviour while interacting with their EU counterparts, be they 
representatives of the civil society, businessmen, students, etc.9 All these policy instruments – 
leverage, linkage, conditionality and socialization - underlined the design of the ENP and the EaP. 
The ENP was launched in 2003 as a result of the EU’s external policy expansion to the new 
neighbours, just before the big enlargement of 2004 entailing ten new Member States (MS). The 
main goal of this policy, which included sixteen countries,10 was primarily to prevent the creation 
of new dividing lines between the EU and neighbouring countries. Democratization, as one of the 
objectives of ENP, was not widely promoted within this policy instrument, according to some 
experts. Secrieru states that the EU has been criticized for having neglected a consistent 
promotion of the democratic processes in target countries.11 A greater attention to the 
democratization processes has been introduced since 2011, when the ENP was revised. This 
review stressed once again the conditional nature of EU’s support leading to the ‘more for more’ 
principle, which means “the more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the 
                                                          
7 Way & Levitsky, “Linkage”, op. cit., p. 50. 
8 M. Emerson, Democratisation in the European Neighbourhood, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
2005, p. 175. 
9 Emerson & Noutcheva, 2005, p. 13 quoted in L. Litra, The EU’s Conditionality in the Case of Moldova (2001-
2009): Failure or Success?, The Study Programme on European Security, January 2011, p. 14. 
10 ENP includes the following countries: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. 
11 Interview with S. Secrieru, Senior Research Fellow at Polish Institute of International Affairs, via Skype, 4 
March 2015.  
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more support it will get from the EU”.12 Six years after ENP was launched, the EU recognized the 
need for more differentiation between the partnership countries. Thus, it launched in May 2009 
the EaP with the main goal to accelerate political association and further economic integration 
within the EU13 and to persuade the partner countries to adopt measures that will contribute to 
EU’s security.14 The new political instrument emphasized the principles of differentiation and 
conditionality. The main incentives provided were visa facilitation and liberalization regimes and 
the possibility to conclude AAs.15  
 
2. Democracy in Georgia and Moldova: State of play  
 
The two former Soviet countries, Georgia and Moldova, obtained their independence after the 
collapse of the USSR. As newly created states, they have experienced similar patterns of 
advancement toward a democratic society. Levitsky & Way characterized the ruling systems of 
these two countries from 1990 onwards as ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’, “where 
competitive elections coexisted with substantial abuses of democratic procedure”.16 In this type 
of system, governments can eliminate independent media, arrest opposition leaders or 
manipulate election results.17 
Weiner explains that democratization in these countries is not linear, but might be frozen or 
it can move towards regression, as was the case for Moldova, which “evolved since 1990/91 from 
an open to a partially closed society from 2001 to 2009 under the Communists’ rule, and then to a 
                                                          
12 European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A new response to a changing neighbourhood, COM(2011) 303, 
Brussels, 25 May 2011. 
13 Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, 8435/09 
(Presse 78), Brussels, 7 May 2009. 
14 V. A. Dias, The Russian factor in EU policies towards the ‘shared neighbourhood’, University of Coimbra, 
Lisbon, April 2013, p. 4. 
15 Baracani, op. cit., pp. 116-124. 
16 S. Levitsky & L. A. Way, “International Linkage and Democratization”, Journal of Democracy XVI, July 2005, 
p. 20. 
17 Ibid., p. 31. 
 13 
more competitive society from 2009 to 2012”.18 In Weiner’s opinion, Moldova has made 
significant progress since 2009, and its regime can no longer be characterized as a ‘competitive 
authoritarian’ one. Moldova’s regime is rather moving toward ‘constitutional liberalism’, a model 
advanced by Zakaria, whose type of regime put the emphasis on the creation of a rule of law 
state and a system of government based on checks and balances.19 Nevertheless, the 
advancement of democracy in Moldova is hindered by state capture.20 
The government system in Georgia is largely similar to that of Moldova. Whether a 
“democracy in zigzag”,21 a “liberal autocracy” or “liberal oligarchy”, Georgia has been 
characterized as a regime in which fundamental freedoms are protected, despite its authoritarian 
tendencies.22 Wheatley says that Georgia has oscillated between two types of regimes, being a 
“democracy without law” during two periods, 1992-1995 and 2001-2003, and a “limited 
democracy” throughout the rest of Georgia’s post-independence history.23 The first type of regime 
was less authoritarian, characterised initially by an on-going consolidation of President Eduard 
Shevardnadze’s authority throughout 1992 to 1995.24 Later, between 2001 and 2003, 
Shevardnadze’s administration was no longer capable of governing.25 The second type of regime 
- “limited democracy”, was characterized by uncompetitive parliamentary and presidential 
elections, “effectively foreclosing the possibility of a rotation of power”.26 
                                                          
18 R. Weiner, “The European Union and Democratization in Moldova” in Carey, Henry F., European 
Institutions, Democratization, and Human Rights Protection in the European Periphery, Lexington Books, 
Lanham, 2014., p. 127. 
19 F. Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, W.W. Norton and Company, 
New York, 2003 quoted in Weiner, op. cit., p. 127. 
20 T. Tudoroiu, Democracy and state capture in Moldova, Democratization, Routledge, 2014, DOI: 
10.1080/13510347.2013.868438. 
21 A. Gegeshidze, “Georgia's Political Transformation: Democracy in Zigzag”, pp. 25-40, in South Caucasus – 
20 Years of Independence, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, ed., Berlin, 2011. 
22 J. Forbrig & P. Demes, eds. Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Washington: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2007, p. 102. 
23 Wheatley in Baracani, op. cit., p. 351. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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Georgia and Moldova are labelled as EaP’s frontrunners in democratization. Such praises 
must be tempered against the background of stagnation and regression of democracy in Eurasia 
in general, and in some of the EaP countries, such as Belarus, Azerbaijan and Armenia, in 
particular. As shown in Table 1, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova are the only countries that have 
achieved some very modest progress in improving their level of democracy.  
 
Source: Freedom House. The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with one representing the highest level of democratic 
progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. 
 
 
3. The effectiveness of EU democratization instruments 
 
The level of democracy in EaP countries has not improved significantly since the launch of 
the ENP and EaP. The modest progress that has been achieved tends to be attributed by scholars 
to the internal factors at play in those countries, such as the ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia or the 
‘Twitter revolution’ in Moldova.27 Many other experts argue that the state of democracy in the 
East even worsened, “leaving the EU with dysfunctional tools […] and limited leverage despite the 
growing complexity of mutual relations”.28  
                                                          
27 S. Bus ̧caneanu, “EU Democracy Promotion in Eastern ENP Countries”, East European Politics and Societies 
and Cultures, Volume 29, No. 1, February 2015, p. 274.  
28 V. Rihackova, Human rights in Eastern Partnership countries, Briefing paper, EP, Directorate-general for 
external policies of the Union, Committee on Subcommittee on Human Rights, Brussels, 2011, p. 6.  
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The results of EU’s democratization policies in Moldova and Georgia are not encouraging, a 
fact that is also acknowledged by European officials: “The implementation [of the ENP and EaP] 
perhaps was not as affective as we would like, it did not work out the way we would like to”.29 
According to Lehne, the EU has been more effective as a model or an ideal rather than as a direct 
political operator, changing the structures on the ground. He does not deem EU’s record as 
particularly positive, because these countries remain quite complicated and the future of their 
democracy is not secure.30 EU’s relative democratic success is partly placed on the absence of a 
significant leverage. Ursu stresses that the leverage could have been stronger and membership 
perspective could strengthen this instrument.31 The trivial successes of EU democratization 
policies in Moldova and Georgia are further explained by the fact that EU was not focused 
exclusively on democratization. Secrieru believes that the EU was mostly focused on improving 
governance and boosting the economic development rather than building democracy. In his 
opinion, if the EU had applied democratization directly, it would have resulted in a more severe 
enforcement of the principle of conditionality. The EU have required from the partner countries to 
hold free and fair elections,32 but the democratic conditionality was very weak, possibly because 
the EU considers that democratization can be achieved by other means and on a much longer 
term. Youngs shares a similar point of view, by showing that the EU does not consistently seek to 
promote democracy in relations with non-candidate countries.33 As an example, Youngs gives the 
                                                          
29 Interview with C. Kendall, Team Leader Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Eastern Partnership - Bilateral 
(III/B/2), EEAS, Brussels, 5 March 2015. 
30 Interview with S. Lehne, Visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, via telephone, 3 March 2015. 
31 Interview with V. Ursu, Regional Manager for the Eurasia Program, Open Society Foundations, via Skype, 
11 March 2015. 
32 Interview with S. Secrieru, cit. 
33 Youngs quoted in S. Lavenex & F. Schimmelfennig, “EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external 
governance in European politics”, Journal of European Public Policy, 2009, p. 808. 
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case of Georgia, when the EU “has been silent on Mikheil Saakashvili’s gradual undermining of 
checks and balances on his power”.34 
Kendall explains that the failure of democratization policies is partly due to the rigidity of 
ENP and EaP. He observes that it is very difficult to program resources over five-year periods and 
then to change the allocation on the fly to match performance. According to the source, the EU 
decided to take an envelope, put it on the side to reward the partners who will perform better, 
according to the principle ‘more for more’. And so it ended up giving these resources only to 
Georgia and Moldova, because they were the best performers, which is pretty low benchmarking, 
losing any real leverage: “These resources are no longer a strong incentive, they become just 
another mechanism”.35  
Another important tool for EU’s democracy promotion, linkage, defined as the density of a 
country’s ties to the West,36 was not fully explored by the EU vis-à-vis Georgia and Moldova. 
These states are falling in the ‘low-linkage to the West’37 category of countries, according to 
Levitsky & Way. The two authors stressed that “leverage is most effective when combined with 
extensive linkage to the West”.38 The weak ties between EU and the two countries were 
determined to some extent by the lack of geographical connection between them, something that 
changed after Moldova became a direct neighbour of the EU in 2007.  
The next EU tool, socialization, which induces democratization through similar methods to 
those of the linkage, has not recorded more encouraging results in Georgia and Moldova. While 
socialization attempts to transfer the EU model of democracy to students, businessmen, it seems 
that in the case of Moldova this instrument was not very effective so far. This reasoning is drawn 
                                                          
34 R. Youngs, “Democracy promotion as external governance?”, Journal of European Public Policy, 2009, p. 
897.  
35 Interview with C. Kendall, cit. 
36 Way & Levitsky, “Linkage”, op. cit., p. 50. 
37 Levitsky & Way, “International likage”, op. cit., p. 30. 
38 Ibid., p. 22. 
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from the fact that Moldovan students do not fully take advantage of the European student 
exchange programs, such as Erasmus Mundus or Tempus IV.39 Likewise, the EU directed its most 
financial assistance towards the Moldovan government rather than financing the civil society, 
which remains weak in Moldova and Georgia.  
 
4. The ‘Russian destabilizing factor’  
Moscow has been assigned the role of a “competing external power”40 that has “negative”41 
effects on democratization processes in post-Soviet countries. Babayan calls Russia a 
“democracy blocker”,42 who is negatively influencing the democratization process in the EaP 
countries, accounting for the major part of their democratic stagnation and setbacks into 
authoritarianism.43 The detrimental role of Russia in the democratization process of EaP 
countries has its origins in the 2000s, when Moscow excluded itself from the ENP framework and 
the very concept of ‘shared neighbourhood’,44 perceiving it as a threat from EU to the Russian 
traditional sphere of influence.45 Researchers consider that EU’s democratization policies in the 
EaP countries constitute a direct threat to the Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime.46 
Svante explains that Putin’s rule feels threatened by the stabilization and democratization of EaP 
states because, in the prospects of stable and democratic institutions, these countries will serve 
                                                          
39 Litra, op. cit., p. 14.  
40 N. Del Medico, A Black Knight in the Eastern Neighbourhood? Russia and EU Democracy Promotion in Armenia 
and Moldova, EU Diplomacy Paper 7, College of Europe, 2014, p. 5.  
41 J. Tolstrup, “Studying a negative external actor: Russia's management of stability and instability in the 
'Near Abroad'”, Democratization, Vol. 16, No. 5, 2009, p. 922 quoted in Del Medico, op. cit., p. 5. 
42 N. Babayan, Democratic Transformation and Obstruction: EU, US, and Russia in the South Caucasus. 
Routledge, 2015, p. 155. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Dias, op. cit., p.7. 
45 J. Gower & G. Timmins, eds., The European Union, Russia and the Shared Neighbourhood, Routledge Europe-
Asia Studies, Vol. 61, issue 10, London, 2011, p. 1. 
46 M. Tsereteli, “Georgia and Moldova: Staying the Course”, in Starr, S. Frederick & Svante Cornell eds., 
Putin's Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents, September 2014, p. 144. 
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the interests of its people rather than those of Russia.47 EU officials also acknowledge this 
incompatibility. They are confirming that EU’s democratization policies threaten the model, which 
underpins the rise of power in Russia, its entire elite and economic structure: “Western 
democracy and rule of law is not compatible with Putin. I think that is a reasonably fair 
conclusion to draw”.48 
Russia's negative reaction in the process of democratization of EaP countries occurs as a 
result of clash49 between its norms and EU’s norms and values, leading to a “normative power 
rivalry between Russia and the EU”50 with “zero-sum calculations and geopolitical competition”.51 
Given the analysis of the reasons that underpin Moscow’s reaction to the EU democratization 
policies in the Neighbourhood, the ‘Russian destabilizing factor’ will be defined as comprising all 
the tactics adopted by Moscow against the EaP states, which include soft power (a shared 
language and a shared culture with the Orthodox heritage), carrots (cheap gas, access to markets, 
subsidies), and sticks (trade sanctions, energy shortages, restrictive migration policies, activation 
of the frozen conflicts).52 As its effects seem to be the most influential on the decision makers 
from EaP countries, an analysis will be dedicated to some of the most important sticks as part of 
the ‘Russian destabilizing factor’.  
 
                                                          
47 S. E. Cornell, “The European Union: Eastern Partnership vs. Eurasian Union”, in Starr et al. eds., op. cit., p. 
186. 
48 Interview with C. Kendall, cit. 
49 For a thorough analysis on the subject see T. Ambrosio, Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to 
Democratization in the Former Soviet Union, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009, 264 p. 
50 Steinkohl 2010 quoted in H. M. Beckman, & L. H. Sørensen & N. R. Gade & X. Kisantal, The normative 
power of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Moldova and Ukraine, Roskilde Universitet, Roskilde (Denmark), 
December 2010, p. 37.  
51 Gower & Timmins, op. cit., p. 2. 
52 “Trading insults: a trade war sputters as the tussle over Ukraine’s future intensifies”, The Economist, 24 
August 2013, retrieved on 9 March 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21583998-trade-war-
sputters-tussle-over-ukraines-future-intensifies-trading- insults. 
 19 
5. The main forms of the ‘Russian destabilizing factor’ 
 
Economic and political pressure are the most common tools used by Russia to hinder the 
democratization processes in Georgia and Moldova. Moscow began using more frequently 
different coercive mechanisms after the launch of the ENP, and especially following the colour 
revolutions in EaP countries.  
Export bans. The change of the Georgian government in 2004, as a result of the Rose revolution, 
was perceived in Moscow as a direct result of EU’s policies pursued in the region. Consequently, 
the Kremlin imposed in 2005-2006 a complete import embargo on all Georgian agricultural 
products, as well as on wine and bottled mineral water. As a pretext for this embargo  the sanitary 
and phytosanitary standards and health concerns were used, but it was clear that this ban, which 
lasted for more that six years, was underpinned by political reasons.53 Although the Georgian 
exports of wine, bottled water and agricultural products declined sharply after the introduction of 
the ban, Georgia survived the Russian embargo and even registered  economic growth of 9 per 
cent in 2006.54 However, the performance was not very easy to achieve and in order to overcome 
the economic shock, Georgia was forced to take intensive actions for diversifying its export 
markets.  
Nonetheless, after the change of government in Georgia and the resumption of trade 
relations with Moscow in 2013, the dependence of Georgian products on the Russian market has 
been growing, even though full trade ban lifting has not yet been achieved.55 The dependence is 
even more important for Georgian wine. Kapanadze says that in the first quarter of 2014, almost 
                                                          
53 D. Cenusa & M. Emerson & T. Kovziridse & V. Movchan, Russia’s Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, CEPS, No. 400, Brussels, September 2014, p. 7. 
54 E. Livny & K. Torosyan & M. Ott, The Economic Impact of the Russian Trade Embargo on Georgia, The ISET 
Policy Institute, Tbilisi, 22 January 2007, p. 5. 
55 Cenusa et al., “Russia’s Punitive”, op. cit., p. 7. 
 20 
70 per cent of Georgian wine exports went to Russia.56 Thus, “a possible re-introduction of 
Russian embargoes on Georgian imports would significantly hurt the Georgian wine industry”.57 A 
renewed economic pressure began to be exercised on Georgia following the conclusion of the 
DCFTA with EU, when Russian press reported that Moscow was planning to unilaterally suspend 
the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Georgia, in force since 1994.58 Even though for now no other 
hostile actions have been undertaken by Moscow, the Russian market remains very instable for 
Georgian products, as proved over time, being perceived as “politically-dependent and unreliable” 
and “a political arm of Russian foreign policy that regularly blocks imports”.59 
Imposing embargoes on Moldovan products was one of the main weapons used 
systematically by Moscow to punish Chisinau’s intentions to move towards European integration. 
Using this type of restrictions has become so usual that some authors stated that banning 
exports from Moldova depends “on the political humour of the Kremlin”.60 The restrictions have 
not sparked Chisinau’s humour though, as the Russian market was and still remains important 
for Moldova’s economy. Being an agricultural country, almost the entire production of fruit, 
vegetables and wine used to be exported to Russia  a market inherited from the Soviet era. The 
situation changed after Chisinau declared in 2005 that integration in the EU is its strategic 
objective. This shift in Moldova’s foreign policy was followed in 2006 by a total embargo on its 
wine production, representing 25 per cent of Moldovan exports.61 In the next years, the embargo 
was extended to other Moldovan products and maintained or removed, depending on Chisinau’s 
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willingness to cooperate with Moscow. Russia’s hostile actions materialized in embargoes 
intensified during 2013, when Moscow announced a new ban on Moldovan wine. The purpose 
was to discourage Chisinau from initiating the AA/DCFTA with the EU.62 This embargo is in force 
until now. In 2014, other restrictions were introduced to constrain Moldova in the process of the 
AA/DCFTA implementation. “As soon as the agreement was ratified, Russia banned Moldovan 
meat and fruit ‘for health reasons’”.63 Also, Russia’s punitive measures aimed at the abolition of 
preferential tariffs on Moldovan exports of goods in the CIS area,64 by removing the ‘zero duty’ for 
19 products65 and thus declining the demand for Moldovan products.  
Energy shortages. As the largest exporter of natural gas,66 Russia was until recently the only 
energy supplier of both Georgia and Moldova. The situation has changed only in the case of 
Georgia, which diversified its energy suppliers and got rid of the Russian gas domination mainly 
due to its location in an area with rich energy resources. However, prior to obtaining 
independence from Russian gas in the Georgian case, both countries had to face enormous 
pressure from Moscow, whereby it halted natural gas supplies. The pressures were motivated 
mainly by Gazprom’s desire to expand its infrastructure, buying gas pipelines in Georgia and 
Moldova and pursuing its interests “to create a unified gas infrastructure… [in order] to control the 
potential gas flow from Iran to the EU”.67 The debts that Georgia and Moldova accumulated in the 
2000s towards Gazprom allowed the Russian company to pressure them to convert these debts 
into Russian infrastructure assets.  
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In lack of other solutions and constrained by a poor economic situation, Moldova sold its 
infrastructure and shares in MoldovaGaz, a subsidiary of Gazprom. Thus, Gazprom currently 
holds 63.4 per cent68 stake in MoldovaGaz and controls Moldova’s domestic gas infrastructure. 
This total dependence on Russian gas allows Moscow to exert enormous pressures on Chisinau 
when it moves closer to the EU. Moldova's gas supply problem worsens as its debts towards 
Gazprom are increasing daily, due to the fact that the breakaway region of Transnistria does not 
pay for its gas consumption since 2009.69 Currently, Moldova's estimated debt to Gazprom 
amounts to USD 3.7 billion,70 of which 90 per cent71 is Transnistria’s debt.  
Activation of the frozen conflicts. The situation in Georgia and Moldova regarding Russia’s 
pressure through frozen conflicts is similar. Both countries went, in the early 1990s, through 
separatist conflicts involving Russian support. These conflicts left behind breakaway regions: in 
Georgia - Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in Moldova – Transnistria.72 Since then, these 
secessionist regions have enjoyed Moscow's support, including financial aid, and have been 
consistently used by Russia as a powerful instrument to hinder the democratization processes in 
Georgia and Moldova. However, experts note one important difference in the level of Russian 
leverage over the two countries. This difference is mainly based on the fact that Russia lost some 
leverage over Georgia after having recognized the independence of the separate regions, 
following the short war of 2008.73 At the same time, Transnistria remains unrecognized by 
Moscow, which keeps an important Russian leverage over Chisinau.74 
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Russia uses many other actions to destabilize the situation in Georgia. Among them, 
scholars enumerate the “borderisation campaigns”, with Russian border guards present along 
South Ossetia’s “state borders” and the installation of barbed-wire partitions at the administrative 
borderline line between the region and the rest of the Georgian territory.75  
The situation in Moldova with the Russian leverage seems even more complex, as Chisinau 
still has reasons to keep Moscow at the negotiating table, hoping to find a better solution than 
the scenario applied in the Georgian case with the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s 
independence. Całus emphasizes that the Transnistrian region seems unable to function by itself, 
being able to survive only thanks to support from Russia,76 which is also its second trade partner 
after Moldova. Being aware of its huge leverage, Moscow does not hesitate to use it in order to 
halt the Europeanization processes, which contravene to Kremlin’s interests.  
 
6. Adapting EU’s democratization policies 
Ownership. One of the basic criticisms of EU’s democratization policies is that the model applied 
in EaP countries, and particularly in Georgia and Moldova, was almost similar to that 
implemented in Central European states: “a copy of the skeleton of the enlargement policy set-
up”.77 The significant difference is that in the case of the Central Europe, EU’s leverage was 
incomparably greater - accession to the European Community, which mainly drove the 
democratization and modernization of societies.  
In the absence of a clear EU membership prospect, the EU loses the legitimacy of using the 
same top-down approach, based on a donor-recipient relationship, the imposition of 
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predetermined formal rules, and the asymmetrical relationship between insiders and outsiders.78 
Sadowski argues that despite declarations about ‘co-ownership’ and the importance of adopting 
coordinated decisions, the ENP and EaP are primarily designed by the EU and serve Brussels’ 
interests.79 The considerable amount of regulations and directives that Georgia and Moldova 
have to transpose into their national legislation demonstrates again the fact that EU is using the 
same pre-accession methodology. This led to a situation in which Georgia and Moldova have to 
transpose into their national legislation more than 300 EU directives and regulations,80 including 
most of the EU trade-related acquis communautaire, without having the same financial support as 
EU-candidate countries. Parmentier points to the same thought: he maintains that the problem 
stems from the difference between claimed objectives - helping these countries to build 
widespread democratic institutions, as in the case of the enlargement policy - and the resources 
allocated to these objectives. Compared to the resources deployed and the regional context, the 
EaP countries have limited results, but at least it should be mentioned that the countries 
concerned do not sink further towards autocratic regimes.81 In a recent co-authored paper, a high-
ranking official from the EEAS suggested that the sheer volume of commitments taken by 
Georgia and Moldova reflects the willingness and ambition of these countries, and that they 
would have had opportunity to negotiate over theses commitments.82  
Differentiation. Another aspect that the EU needs to improve is strengthening the differentiation 
between the countries included in EU democratization policies. Different scenarios are proposed 
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for the differentiation between EaP countries. The assumption that all EaP countries are heading 
in the same direction, but at different speeds, is no longer relevant in the current situation and 
“moving ahead calls for a differentiated ‘3-1-2’ approach in response to the different 
circumstances the EU faces”.83 Gromadzki considers that EaP countries have to be divided into 
two groups: those having an AA with the EU, and the rest.84 However, the differentiation into two 
groups would be still “too rough”,85 explain Delcour & Costanyan, who refer to the different stage 
of economic and political reform in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The two authors call for a 
more tailored adjustment of the AAs signed with these countries during their implementation 
phase.86 Stewart argues that offers should be adapted to the situation of each country and to 
correspond both to the agenda of the country and to that of the EU.87  
Focus. Focus of the EaP has to be re-evaluated, by making this policy more geopolitical, putting 
more emphasis on EU’s values and norms, and reducing the bureaucratic and technical 
dimension of the EaP,88 Sadowski argues. Gromadzki is advocating the same idea, namely a 
returned EaP initiative “much more politically oriented and less technically oriented”.89 Emerson 
recommends a similar approach towards Neighbourhood policies: “more targeted and geo-
political, and less a bureaucratic robot for demanding indiscriminate compliance with masses of 
EU laws”.90  
Respect for human rights, free and fair elections, independence of the media and of the 
judiciary have to be further strengthened and have to receive much more attention in the bilateral 
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cooperation between the EU and the partner countries. These issues are important in the context 
in which many experts would say that the EU was not so strict and dedicated to its democratic 
values when it established cooperation programs with some of the EaP countries. More targeted 
policies would mean the prioritization of domains in which transformation might be induced, 
focusing on key issues for the current capacity of the EU and its partner.91 Because of the 
partners’ limited capacities, they cannot undergo fast and deep transformations in all areas at the 
same time, Sadowski says.  
Flexibility. EU’s democratization policies towards Georgia and Moldova also require more 
flexibility and quicker responses to the challenges faced by the two countries. Even though some 
improvements might be achieved in this regard, the rigidity of the democratization instruments 
will not be completely eliminated because of the very nature of EU foreign policy, constrained by 
the need for coordinated actions between MS. 
An EEAS official explains that the rigidity of EU’s policies is partly due to the inflexibility of 
the funding instruments and of the multiannual financial framework, traditionally adopted for a 
period of seven years.92 EU finds it hard to program resources especially when applying the 
principle of ‘more for more’, which makes it unable to predict the performance of the partner 
countries and the ‘envelope’ that will be needed to reward these performances. Cenusa raises the 
necessity to deploy certain risk assessment tools. The expert points out that the EU has to realize 
that Eastern Europe is a very specific area, where changes might occur quickly, depending on the 
regional factors, one of which is Russia. Thus, the EU is obliged to clearly assess the foreseeable 
scenarios for the region. Delecour & Kostanyan suggest that the EU should also be more flexible 
towards Georgia and Moldova in terms of its requirements for the transposition of the acquis 
communautaire. In their opinion, the acquis was designed for the needs of the MS and its 
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effectiveness may be questioned as long as Georgia and Moldova have a different level of 
development.93 
However, Youngs does not apparently welcome a greater degree of flexibility for EU 
policies. The author examines the case of Armenia, where EU has already begun to show more 
flexibility in choosing areas of cooperation, based on the interests of the country.94 Youngs 
shows that EU’s willingness to be flexible in Armenia does not solve the problem of “how the EU 
can and should fashion a more effective geostrategic identity in its East”.95  
6.1. Revitalizing leverage, conditionality, linkage and socialization  
It is not a revelation that the EU has “too little influence”96 in EaP countries, including in 
Georgia and Moldova, which renders its democratization tools ineffective in imposing the change 
the EU wants. Both partner countries as well as European officials admit in their discourses that 
the EU is not as attractive97 to the EaP states as Brussels envisioned it. Moreover, EU’s modest 
influence on EaP countries is eclipsed by the more assertive Russia, which proposes a different 
model of development and integration, one that can be less costly for the corrupt elites of these 
countries. In this respect, the EU has to bear in mind that, unlike Central European countries, 
which in the 1990s could only count on their Euro-Atlantic integration, “European integration is 
not the only option for the Eastern European states”.98 Because they have to face the 
considerable Russian pressure and to ‘pay’ a high price for their European choice, the EaP 
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countries “are increasingly disillusioned with EU’s policy, because what the Union has to offer 
does not match their expectations”.99  
Many academics and practitioners explain the gap between EU’s offer and the expectations 
of Georgia and Moldova by the lack of a clear EU membership perspective for these countries. 
More specifically, the absence of EU membership prospects diminishes EU's leverage on these 
states and undermines the long-term benefits, which might be generated “if their ultimate aim 
was clearly defined”.100 Gromadzki says that Georgia and Moldova “should be perceived as more 
than partners”,101 and the EU Council should follow EP’s example and officially declare the right of 
Georgia and Moldova to make use of the Article 49 TEU. While Emerson considers that politicians 
are to be blamed for being unable to overcome disagreement over EaP countries’ membership 
perspectives,102 Bobinski stresses that EU is trapped by the enlargement fatigue and by the fears 
to provoke Russia in the current unstable situation in the region.103 Under these conditions and in 
the hypothesis of a stable situation, the EU should rely on enhancing of the ‘more for more’ 
principle as one of the main leverage.104 However, the implementation of this principle will be 
more effective only when the performance of the two countries will be evaluated on a country-
based approach instead of a wider regional comparison as done currently. This shift in the 
assessment methodology is needed for avoiding situations whereby the principle ‘more for more’ 
becomes a simple mechanism, instead of serving as means for leverage.  
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Extending an enhanced ‘more for more’ principle has to be accompanied by a more objective 
and strong conditionality, since it is currently assessed as weak.105 Many authors agree that EU 
has to apply systematically a strict conditionality, which was not always the case in the past. For 
example, in the case of the Republic of Moldova, after the power shift in 2009, the EU mistakenly 
perceived politicians’ commitment as a genuine engagement to European integration. However, 
EU’s overly optimistic expectations for democracy promotion were never met by truly democratic 
deliveries of the Moldovan government: as the 2014 parliamentary elections demonstrated, the 
democratization process was not sustainable and could be easily reversed. The result of this 
overconfidence came at a price for the EU, which “became associated with the misdeeds of the 
pro-European coalitions”106 and further lost the confidence of the Moldovan people. In a recent 
survey, being faced with the choice between joining of the EU and Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), 
the first option was chosen by 32% of respondents, and the second - by 50% of respondents, 
while 18% of respondents did not want to answer to this question.107 
The same conclusion was drawn from the Georgian case, where reforms were rather 
superficial, with still not sufficiently strong institutions and with democracy linked very much to 
political personality.108 While acknowledging the unsystematic use of conditionality, Secrieru 
wonders whether a more severe conditionality would lead to higher or lower results.109 At least in 
the Belarusian case, where the EU has been very strict with the democratic conditionality,  
progress was absent in this direction. However, Georgia and Moldova’s aspirations to join the EU 
should serve as strong incentives for European officials to impose a strict conditionality on these 
countries. The EU should no longer trust the governments of these countries only on the basis of 
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the politicians’ statements. Moreover, the EU must no longer allow the coalition governments to 
assign positions in the institutions of the judiciary on the basis of party affiliation.  
Besides strengthening conditionality and the ‘more for more’ principle, many experts call 
upon the EU to concentrate its efforts on creating tight links between the people of Georgia and 
Moldova and those of the EU MS. This aspect is very important in the opinion of specialists, 
because civil society may represent a fundamental tool in maintaining pressure on the 
governments of Georgia and Moldova in the process of advancing democratic reforms. Therefore, 
the EU is called “to place greater premium on contacts with civil society […] and recognise these 
contacts as being equally important as contacts with governments”.110  
Furthermore, the EU should reconsider its communication strategies in Georgia and 
Moldova and envisage an expansion of the resources allocated to this aim.111 These 
communication strategies are needed especially to counter Russia’s propaganda112 and to inform 
in a consistent way about the achievements of the partner countries. For example, Cenusa 
believes that the communication campaign regarding the AA between Moldova and the EU was 
started too late. Already at the time of its initiation, there could have been in place a specific 
information strategy for Georgia and Moldova with concrete explanations about the possible 
outcomes of the document’s provisions for the citizens of these countries. This might have 
helped avoiding the crisis in the Moldovan autonomy of Gagauzia in 2014.113 The information 
strategies should emphasize the short-term effects. In this respect, the EU should consider 
splitting the process of Europeanization into smaller stages in order to increase the chances of 
success for easily measurable benefits. 
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6.2. Can the EU and Russia agree on common democratization policies in Georgia and 
Moldova?  
The hypothesis about the cooperation between the EU and Russia in designing the process 
of democratization policies in EaP countries was advanced in this paper due to the numerous 
criticisms levelled to Brussels concerning its mistake for having excluded Moscow from this 
process. Academics, EU officials, as well as representatives of the partner countries argue that 
the EU neglected “Russia’s role as a strategic player”114 in EaP states, and therefore Moscow 
must be brought back to the discussion table, “in order for the EaP policy to become ultimately 
successful”.115 In Parmentier’s opinion, the main failure of the EaP is to have marginalized 
Russia.116  
As a result, the EU is already considering, within the on-going ENP review,117 on how to 
effectively cooperate with ‘the neighbours of neighbours’, among others, having in mind Russia. 
On its part, Russia is trying for some years now to convince EU to engage in the deepening of 
their economic relations through the means of a CES ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’.118  
In testing the hypothesis whether cooperation between the EU and Russia is possible or 
not, there have been identified two major obstacles that prevent this cooperation. The first one 
consists in the lack of common values on which these geopolitical powers could build a 
partnership. The second one refers to the complete absence of EU’s confidence towards the 
Kremlin regime. Furthermore, any possible cooperation between these two powers is almost 
excluded for the near future, considering the current instable situation in Ukraine. Additionally, 
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the establishment of any kind of partnership is conditioned by Russia returning to the application 
of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 on the territorial integrity and independence of its neighbours,119 
and respecting the two Minsk agreements.120 
Secrieru finds that upon an objective assessment of the previous attempts to build a 
strategic partnership between EU and Russia based on ‘four spaces’,121 this cooperation did not 
work because Russia has other interests, not because EU lacks willingness to cooperate.122 In his 
opinion, there are no chances for any kind of cooperation between the EU and Russia in the area 
of democratization in EaP countries. Secrieru stresses that Russia promotes a different type of 
democracy, which is the opposite model of that promoted by the EU. Therefore, the most that can 
be done in terms of cooperation between EU and Russia is to establish some form of redlines 
that cannot be trampled. Parmentier shares Secrieru’s opinion, by adding that democracy does 
not seem a common goal for EU and Russia, thus cooperation in this area is not possible for the 
simple reason that the very definition of democracy is not shared between Europeans and 
Russians.123  
Ursu advances a similar sceptical opinion regarding a possible cooperation between the EU 
and Russia. He argues that there cannot be any sectorial cooperation between the two powers, 
including in the EaP countries, as long as there is an on-going conflict in Ukraine where Russia is 
directly involved.124 In the current conditions, the conclusion of any cooperation between 
Brussels and Moscow might be interpreted as a reward to Russia, despite its obstructionist 
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actions in the region.125 Any type of cooperation, should it occur in the security, trade, or energy 
areas, would be viewed as “a weakness of the EU”.126 Ursu adds that, unlike the EU, which invests 
in the development of democratic elections and independent judicial systems, Russia supports 
the maintenance in power of corrupt governments in EaP countries, which are much easier to 
blackmail, and thus to have them as faithful allies.127 Bond explains the same differentiation 
between the approaches of the EU and Russia towards EaP countries. He says that the EU is 
aiming at making its neighbours stronger by sharing its values of democracy, while Russia wants 
their neighbours either as vassals or as enemies.128 Ursu explains that the EU and Russia also 
have different understandings of the notions of stability and prosperity. This was demonstrated 
by the fact that the two geo-political powers could not advance in their negotiations on the new 
strategic partnership. “If the EU and Russia could not agree on the development of their own 
bilateral relations, how could they agree on a common vision regarding the development of the 
EaP countries”,129 asks Ursu.  
EU officials, interviewed within this research, expressed a more positive opinion about a 
potential cooperation between EU and Russia. Kendall considers that cooperation is definitely 
possible, but it requires confidence and dialog, which are currently lacking. In his opinion, Russian 
officials should first have the willingness to cooperate, then to demonstrate that they mean it and 
finally to prove that they can be trusted.130 
The experts who expressed a sceptical opinion about a possible cooperation between the 
EU and Russia consider that the only hope that exists is the change of regime in Kremlin in 2018 
or in 2024. “The geo-political competition to the East will last at least until the end of the Putin 
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era”.131 At the same time, the prospects for a possible maintenance in power of Putin’s regime 
beyond 2018 would be very unfavourable for the EU-Russia cooperation and moreover, for the 
future development of the European continent, considers Secrieru.132  
The analysis of views above proves that there are an overwhelming number of experts who 
do not see any potential for cooperation between the EU and Russia in the field of 
democratization of the EaP countries. However, many other experts would say that these 
pessimistic views are not the best solution for the development of the European continent and, 
most importantly, they cannot represent a sustainable long-term vision for the two powers. In this 
respect, Parmentier believes that if the two Minsk agreements are respected, there will be 
certainly a need to find a solution for getting out of the crisis. It might take several months at 
best, and most likely even years before finding a new way for cooperation is possible, considers 
Parmentier. Delcour & Costanyan also emphasized that despite lacking common values, the EU 
“needs a strategy towards Russia that goes beyond sanctions”,133 stressing that “an outright split 
would be much more problematic because of the interdependence of the two partners”.134 
Therefore, Stewart urges the EU “to remove faulty assumptions of Russian support for 
democratization”135 and to focus on cooperation in areas where this is possible. Youngs also opts 
for the inclusion of Russia in a more constructive dialog, pointing to the fact that further 
destabilization of the Russian economy might affect the security in Europe, which is not in the 
interests of the EU.136  
The solution for an EU-Russia cooperation, which was most frequently advanced by the 
interviewees, as well as by the literature, is the establishment of a CES ‘from Lisbon to 
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Vladivostok’. Even though this idea may sound utopian to many, Emerson points out that “the 
status quo is a messy amalgam of competing and partly overlapping projects”,137 between Russia 
and the EU.  
6.3. Would a common economic space ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’ be suitable for 
democratization? 
The idea of creating a CES ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’ is not a new one.138 Its roots can be 
traced back to the late 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev called for a “common European home” in 
his speech at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in 1989.139 Boris Eltsin resumed the initiative in 
1997 within the same European forum, calling for “a Europe in which large and small countries 
will be equal partners united by common democratic values”.140 The liberal and democratic 
rhetoric of this initiative was, however, left aside by Vladimir Putin, who took over the idea since 
2000s.141 He detailed the initiative of a CES in a German newspaper editorial142 in 2010, and then 
he reiterated it later in different speeches and press articles.143 “[We] are proposing [...] the 
creation of a harmonious community of economies ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’, [… with] possibly 
a free-trade zone and even more advanced forms of economic integration”,144 Putin said. His plan 
for a ‘Greater Europe’ was providing for cooperation in the areas of economy, energy, science, 
education and human contacts, while making it clear that “the EU should not expect Russia to 
first adopt European standards”.145 As for the EaP countries, according to Putin’s plan, they would 
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have joined the CES ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’ via EaU, alleging that an initial accession to the 
EaU/CU would help EaP countries to “integrate into Europe sooner and from a stronger 
position”.146 Putin insisted for the realization of this plan and even managed to convince 
countries like France and Italy to support Moscow's position “that the four ‘roadmaps’ developing 
‘common spaces’ with Russia should be adopted separately, rather than through EU’s suggestion 
of adopting them as one package.147 However, a large number of MS opposed this scenario due 
to the fact that it lacked other ‘common spaces’, such as freedom, security and justice, which 
otherwise also included democratic values.148 
Therefore, the idea of a CES ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’ has not been realized mainly due 
to the discrepancies in values between the two powers. However, the situation has radically 
changed after the Ukrainian crisis, following which there were taken actions that indicate the 
possible implementation of at least some of the components of Putin’s CES. Even though in 
March 2014 the EU suspended its bilateral talks with the Russian Federation,149 Brussels was 
later forced to change its position towards Moscow. As a proof can serve EU’s attempt to lure 
Ukraine into a trilateral trade format, including Russia, making it clear to Ukraine that it “should 
seek to accommodate its EU FTA with an older agreement it had with Russia”.150 Kendall believes 
that the decision to involve Russia in the discussion over the implementation of the DCFTA in 
Ukraine is rather controversial and it is questionable whether this was the right thing to do.151  
The model of trilateral talks between EU, Russia and Ukraine could be extended to other 
countries, like Georgia and Moldova. A high EU official confirmed that in March 2015 technical 
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talks between the EU and the EaU as such were held on the possibility of overcoming certain 
existing difficulties that made it impossible for the EaU and for the DCFTAs signed by Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia with the UE to be fully compatible.152 According to the source, there are 
already two cases, Serbia and Israel, which have a FTA with both the EU and Russia.153  
Emerson advances exactly the same idea. He says that the EU, Russia and all that lies in-
between “have to find a formula for coming together in a civilized way. The fundamental 
resolution of the big mess has to come through a return to the noble idea of the Common 
European Home”.154 One of the possible scenarios would be for Georgia and Moldova to have a 
FTA with both EU and Russia, which might be seen as “a more radical route of forming a Pan-
European free trade area”.155 This would require the modernization of the Russian economy and 
addressing the problem of technical standards, stresses Emerson. In the context of compatibility 
between the EaU and the EU, Wiegand & Shulz say that not only Russia will have to adapt its 
economy to the WTO standards, but also the other two members of the EaU, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. “It will require that all CU members demonstrate willingness to undertake liberalizing 
steps to fulfil WTO criteria for a FTA”.156 
Kendall agrees in saying that there is no reason why the ECU cannot coexist with the EU 
and have shared standards.157 “That is easily done. That is our daily work here; we can easily 
have parties working together to negotiate common standards. But in order to do that, you need a 
partner you can negotiate with”.158  
Besides the trilateral talks already applied in the case of Ukraine, both EU officials and 
experts talk more frequently about the possibility of creating a CES ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’. 
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An eloquent example is the speech of the former president of the EC Jose Manuel Barroso, who 
stated after the EU-Russia Summit in January 2014 that the creation of a CES ‘from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok’ could reinforce the trust between Brussels and Moscow. “It may seem a dream, but 
dreams can become reality”,159 Barroso said. Likewise, the factsheet of the same summit 
mentioned that both sides would like to lay the foundations for a future CES from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific.160 
Lehne thinks that it remains in EU’s interests to move in the direction of a dialog between 
EaP countries, EU and Eurasian Union (EaU), which could be, in his opinion, a way to overcome 
the trade barriers that are now consequences of the weak cooperative developments.161 “I think 
that clearly we should aim at a situation when Russia and the EU cooperate and support 
countries ‘in-between’, and help them to develop in a positive fashion.”162  
However, there are experts who believe that the creation of a CES ‘from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok’, to the detriment of European values, would not lead to a very positive democratic 
development neither for the EaP countries, nor for the European continent. “The battle chosen by 
Putin is over European democratic civilization for the 21st century. The scope is to re-expand the 
frontiers of political darkness and coercive foreign policy.”163 Given that the level of democracy in 
the world has regressed,164 more than ever must the EU ensure that the democratic values, based 
on which it was created, are expanded everywhere in Europe. The EU must understand that its 
tensions with Russia are the result of “the rivalry between liberal democracy and the so-called 
‘modern authoritarianism’ [which] became more attractive to many countries in Europe and 
                                                          
159 European Commission, Statement by President Barroso following the EU-Russia Summit, Brussels, 28 
January 2014. 
160 Council of the European Union, Factsheet EU-Russia summit, Brussels, 28 January 2014. 
161 Interview with Lehne, cit. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Emerson, “After the Vilnius fiasco”, op. cit., p. 16. 
164 According to Gromadzki, op. cit., p.28, for the 8th consecutive year there were more declines in 
democracy than gains. Freedom of the Press 2015 finds also that global press freedom declined in 2014 to 
its lowest point in more than 10 years. 
 39 
around the world now than they were two decades ago”.165 Russia plays a key role in the world’s 
democratic decline,166 becoming a country that is “less democratic, less economically liberal and 
less co-operative internationally”167 after Putin's 15-years regime. 
This is why Gromadzki believes that a CES ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’ would provide the 
EaP states with the status of ‘transitional countries’ between two blocs, without the possibility to 
integrate into the EU.168 This will further reduce EU's leverage on Georgia and Moldova, which 
even in the current conditions remains modest. “Moscow wants to weaken the Union’s influence 
in Russia’s Neighbourhood and to ensure that the EU notions of rule of law do not spread too 
far.”169  
Before accepting the creation of a CES ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’, the EU should consider 
the results it has obtained upon previous concessions it has made to Moscow. Azubalis states 
that as a result of EU’s consent to include Russia in G8 and WTO, Brussels got in return a war in 
Georgia and one in Ukraine, and the violation of WTO rules.170 The EU should learn from these 
experiences. Before making any concessions to Russia, the EU needs to speed up reforms in EaP 
countries and grant membership prospects to the states that are aspiring to it, “otherwise the 
geo-political vacuum will be very soon filled by Russia”.171 This is because only a mature 
democracy in Georgia and Moldova can inspire other countries in the region to choose the same 
path,172 while allowing the EU to contribute to the promotion of “principles that have made the EU 
a beacon of prosperity and political freedom”.173  
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Conclusion and recommendations  
The European continent is going through the most difficult period after the end of the Cold War. 
At the same time, the level of democracy in the world has been constantly decreasing during the 
past years, with more and more states heading towards authoritarian regimes. The EU and 
Russia are among the key actors who contributed each in its own way to these circumstances. 
The role of the EU and Russia is particularly important in the evolution of democracy in the 
countries of Eastern Europe, including Georgia and Moldova, which were the focus of this work.  
Assuming that the democratization process as part of the ENP and EaP can be considered 
a threat to Russia and hence a ‘destabilizing factor’ for the EU, this paper tried to explain what 
changes can be made to EU’s policies, and to what extent a cooperation between EU and Russia 
is possible in the process of designing the democratization policies in EaP countries. 
The EU did not have a strong enough leverage to influence Georgia and Moldova in moving 
faster to the implementation of democratic reforms. Likewise, the EU has not imposed a strict 
conditionality to boost the democratization process. Instead, Brussels has given unjustified trust 
to politicians, which have slowed down the reforms, thereby losing the trust of citizens and 
undermining the image of the EU. Meanwhile, Russia has applied systematically all the possible 
pressuring tools to halt Georgia and Moldova from their advancement towards democratization.  
In a context of continuous Russian pressures and certain weaknesses of EU’s 
democratization policies, this paper advocates for changes in EU’s strategies for Georgia and 
Moldova. The EU applied in Georgia and Moldova the same top-down approach of 
democratization as in the candidate states, except for leaving a certain room for manoeuvre. This 
conclusion validates the first hypothesis of the paper: Brussels needs to revisit this aspect and 
ensure a better inclusion of ‘the others’ in the process of designing cooperation policies. The EU 
should also apply a higher degree of differentiation between EaP countries, even between Georgia 
and Moldova, by adapting its policies to the situation of each of these states, especially during 
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the implementation of the AA/DCFTA. In the same context, it would be welcomed if the EU made 
its policies towards Georgia and Moldova more geo-political, less technically oriented and more 
focused on democratization. The flexibility of EU policies could be strengthened by the 
deployment of risk assessment tools, in order to be prepared to act quickly in various scenarios 
that might occur in such an instable region.  
EU also needs to revitalize the instruments it uses for the implementation of 
democratization policies. Granting EU membership prospects to Georgia and Moldova could 
strengthen EU’s leverage. But since this seems impossible in the current circumstances, the EU 
will have to make use of a more systematic application of the ‘more for more’ principle. This 
principle has to be combined with objective benchmarking and assessment methods of the 
countries’ democratization progress. Brussels has to apply a more strict conditionality, and to 
strengthen its cooperation with the civil society of the two countries. Last but not least, the EU 
needs to build an efficient communication strategy in order to better convey the achievements of 
its policies in partner countries, and thus informing citizens in those states about the benefits 
they may have following the implementation of reforms.  
The cooperation between the EU and Russia in designing democratization policies in 
Georgia and Moldova is virtually impossible, as long as the two geo-political powers have 
different views on notions of stability, prosperity and democracy. At the same time, the possibility 
to establish an economic cooperation between the EU and Russia by creating a CES ‘from Lisbon 
to Vladivostok’ is becoming increasingly plausible. A radical way of implementing this economic 
cooperation seems to already take place in Ukraine, through the trilateral talks between the EU, 
Russia and Ukraine on the implementation of the country’s DCFTA with the EU. Thus, Ukraine 
might be the first state in Eastern Europe that has a FTA with both the EU and the EaU. Although 
nothing yet indicates that a similar tactic could be applied in the case of Georgia and Moldova, 
this scenario cannot be permanently excluded. Even though such a scenario would have the 
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potential to reduce the confrontation between the EU and Russia in their common 
Neighbourhood, including Georgia and Moldova, this trade cooperation will however have a 
negative impact on the on-going democratic reforms in the two countries. What this cooperation 
could mean for the EU, in the words of the former European Commissioner for Enlargement, 
Štefan Füle, is a “slide back in the direction of real politics only” 174 a slide that the EU should not 
uphold, but might be obliged to do so, in the detriment of the democratic values that it cherishes.  
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Europe is in a constant state of flux. European politics, economics, law and indeed 
European societies are changing rapidly. The European Union itself is in a continuous situation of 
adaptation. New challenges and new requirements arise continually, both internally and 
externally.  
The College of Europe Studies series seeks to publish research on these issues done at the 
College of Europe, both at its Bruges and its Natolin (Warsaw) campus. Focused on the European 
Union and the European integration process, this research may be specialised in the areas of 
political science, law or economics, but much of it is of an interdisciplinary nature. The objective 
is to promote understanding of the issues concerned and to make a contribution to ongoing 
discussions. 
 
L’Europe subit des mutations permanentes. La vie politique, l’économie, le droit, mais 
également les sociétés européennes, changent rapidement. L’Union européenne s’inscrit dès lors 
dans un processus d’adaptation constant. Des défis et des nouvelles demandes surviennent sans 
cesse, provenant à la fois de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur. 
La collection des Cahiers du Collège d’Europe publie les résultats des recherches menées 
sur ces thèmes au Collège d’Europe, au sein de ses deux campus (Bruges et Varsovie). Focalisés 
sur l’Union européenne et le processus d’intégration, ces travaux peuvent être spécialisés dans 
les domaines des sciences politiques, du droit ou de l’économie, mais ils sont le plus souvent de 
nature interdisciplinaire. La collection vise à approfondir la compréhension de ces questions 
complexes et contribue ainsi au débat européen. 
 
 
 54 
Series Titles: 
 
vol. 18 Schunz, Simon, European Union Foreign Policy and the Global Climate Regime, 
2014 (371 p.), ISBN 978-2-87574-134-9 pb, 978-3-0352-6409-8 (eBook) 
vol. 17 Govaere, Inge / Hanf, Dominik (eds.), Scrutinizing Internal and External Dimensions of 
European Law volumes I and II, 2013 (880 p.), ISBN 978-2-87574-085-4 pb, ISBN 978-3-0352-
6342-8 (eBook)  
vol. 16 Chang, Michele / Monar, Jӧrg (eds.), The European Commission in the Post-Lisbon 
Era of Crises: Between Political Leadership and Policy Management, 2013 (298 p.), ISBN 978-
2-87574-028-1 pb, ISBN 978-3-0352-6294-0 (eBook) 
vol. 15 Mahnke, Dieter / Gstӧhl, Sieglinde (eds.), European Union Diplomacy: Coherence, 
Unity and Effectiveness, 2012 (273 p.) ISBN 978-90-5201-842-3 pb, ISBN 978-3-0352-6172-1 
(eBook) 
vol. 14 Lannon, Erwan (ed.), The European Neighborhood Policy’s Challenges, 2012 (491p.), 
ISBN 978-90-5201-779-2 pb, ISBN 978-3-0352-6104-2 (eBook) 
vol. 13 Cremona, Marise / Monar, Jörg / Poli Sara (eds.), The External Dimension of the 
European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 2011 (432 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-
728-0 pb, ISBN 978-3-0352-6107-3 (eBook) 
vol. 12 Men, Jong / Balducci, Giuseppe (eds.), Prospects and Challenges for EU-China 
Relations in the 21st Century, 2010 (262 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-641-2 pb. 
vol. 11 Monar, Jörg (ed.), The Institutional Dimension of the European Union’s Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, 2010 (268 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-615-3 pb. 
vol. 10 Hanf, Dominik / Malacek, Klaus / Muir, elise (eds.), Langues et construction 
européenne, 2010 (286 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-594-1 pb.  
vol. 9 Pelkmans, Jacques / Hanf, Dominik / Chang, Michele (eds.), The EU Internal Market in 
Comparative Perspective,  2008 (314 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-424-1 pb.  
vol. 8 Govaere, Inge / Ullrich, Hanns (eds.), Intellectual Property, Market Power and the Public 
Interest, 2008 (315 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-422-7 pb. 
vol. 7 Inotai, András, The European Union and Southeastern Europe: Troubled Waters Ahead?, 
2007 (414 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-071-7 pb. 
vol. 6 Govaere, Inge / Ullrich, Hanns (eds.), Intellectual Property, Public Policy, and 
International Trade, 2007 (232 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-064-9 pb. 
vol. 5 Hanf, Dominik / Muñoz, Rodolphe (eds.), La libre circulation des personnes: États des 
lieux et perspectives, 2007 (329 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-061-8 pb. 
vol. 4 Mahncke, Dieter / Gstöhl, Sieglinde (eds.), Europe's Near Abroad: Promises and 
Prospects of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy, 2008 (316 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-047-2. 
 55 
vol. 3 Mahncke, Dieter / Monar, Jörg (eds.), International Terrorism: A European Response to 
a Global Threat? 2006 (191p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-046-5 / US-ISBN 978-0-8204-6691-0 pb. 
vol. 2 Demaret, Paul / Govaere, Inge / Hanf, Dominik (eds.), European Legal Dynamics - 
Dynamiques juridiques européennes, Revised and updated edition of 30 Years of European 
Legal Studies at the College of Europe, 2005 / 2007 (571 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-067-0 pb. 
vol. 1 Mahncke, Dieter / Ambos, Alicia / Reynolds, Christopher (eds.), European Foreign 
Policy: From Rhetoric to Reality?, 2004 / second printing 2006 (381 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-
247-6 / US-ISBN 978-0-8204-6627-9 pb.  
 
 
 
 
If you would like to be added to the mailing list and be informed of new publications and 
department events, please email rina.balbaert@coleurope.eu. Or find us on Facebook: College of 
Europe Politics and Administration Department. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
